This article presents the legal outlooks of two fundamental religious judicial systems -Jewish (Halakha) and Muslim (Shari'a) -on the effect of war on private ownership. To be precise, this is when the conquered inhabitants are Jews or Muslims and halakhah or shari'a are their religion, respectively, but the conqueror is a non-believer or secular sovereign. Such situations evoke the following questions: To what extent the transfer of ownership by the conquering sovereign is recognized by the religious laws of the conquered population? May a member of the conquered religion acquire property that was seized by the non-believer sovereign from a member of the conquered religion? Is transfer of ownership by virtue of conquest permanent or reversible, so once the conquest ends, ownership reverts to the pre-conquest owner? Various approaches to those questions within each of two religious legal systems, are presented. Some of the similarities and the differences between Halakha and Shari'a are pointed out.
Introduction
War has been part of the human situation since the dawn of history. War has many aims: destroying the enemy, territorial annexation, obtaining spoils of war, and subjugating the conquered population. Religions have added religious overtones to wars -"commanded war" (milhemet mitzvah), crusade, and jihad -to glorify God's name. 15-22. according to halakhah, this property is really considered to be under Jewish ownership or whether it remains the property of the non-Jewish owners who abandoned it. 8 Rabbis were interested in this matter because of religious questions which arose with regard to eating fruit that is grown on non-Jewish land in the shmittah year, exemption from the obligation of tithes, and observing the commandment of bitter herbs (marror) using lettuce grown on land that was abandoned by its non-Jewish owners. In addition to the perspective of halakhah, we will deal with hypothetical questions from the Muslim perspective. Let us assume a situation wherein the State of Israel announces a tender for the sale of flats or land or other property abandoned by Muslims. According to shari'a, may a Muslim purchase property that once belonged to another Muslim? And if he did purchase it, is he obligated, according to shari'a, to return the property to its original owners? Answers to these questions are inferred from shari'a's view of the ability of the State of Israel to expropriate private property.
9
As mentioned, according to modern laws of war, the successor state is totally prohibited from causing harm to the private property of the inhabitants of the predecessor state. This is because modern international law regards war as an event that takes place between states, and not between a state and the individual inhabitants of the other state, nor between the individuals of the fighting states. Therefore, individuals do not have to suffer its consequences, and the successor state must protect their ownership rights. 10 This does not hold true in halakhah or in shari'a.
Neither of these legal systems makes a distinction between the warring states and their inhabitants, conceivably because the laws of war in each of these religions were formulated before the conceptualization of a modern state that is distinct from the private individuals who reside in it. War in Judaism and Islam is perceived as an act of rivalry between the warring nations themselves, without differentiating between defense and policing forces on the one hand, and the citizens on the other.
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Therefore, and as will be discussed in this article, halakhah and shari'a each have different schools of thought which hold differing views, and which recognize the ability of the conqueror to acquire ownership of private property through an act of war, in contradiction to modern laws of war.
There is another fundamental difference between modern laws of war and the laws of war according to halakhah and shari'a. Whereas modern laws of war apply equally to each of the warring parties, irrespective of their religions or nationalities, the laws of war according to halakhah and shari'a differ according to the religion of the successor or predecessor party: Halakhic laws of war differ according to whether the ruling regime is Jewish and the conquered regime is non-Jewish, or whether the ruling regime is non-Jewish and the conquered regime is Jewish. Similarly, shari'a distinguishes between laws which apply to a successor Muslim regime and a conquered population that is non-Muslim and the opposite circumstance of a nonMuslim successor regime and a conquered population that is Muslim. The laws of war of the "predecessor" religion primarily address questions of the extent to which the transfer of ownership of the booty seized by the conquering sovereign who is not a member of the predecessor religion is recognized by the We would like to make two methodological comments:
(1) This is not a historical-chronological article, but rather a conceptual-legal one. (2) Since halakhah and shari'a did not copy or assimilate each other's laws, but each developed from within, based on the theological and metaphysical precepts of each, they will be presented separately in the next two sections, and then compared in the fourth section. The metaphor of a pool (i.e., mikve = ritual bath) may be understood in three ways:
The Approach of Halakhah
(1) Just as a mikve completely purifies unclean vessels, so conquest creates a real acquisition and effects full ownership of the possessions of the conquered. It constitutes a stronger form of acquisition than the usual mode of acquisition, which entails the owner's agreement to the acquisition, despite the fact that the confiscation of possessions from their original owners could be regarded simply as theft.
(2) Just as a mikve purifies an object that was contaminated by the most extreme level of impurity but does not purify the source of the uncleanness, and just as a person who immerses himself in a mikve while holding an insect in his hand cannot be purified, thus money belonging to a Jew cannot be transferred through conquest by a Jewish conqueror since he himself is bound by Torah Law and this transfer would therefore be regarded as theft. 20 Thus, in the above citation, only the 20 In 1Sam 8:11 Samuel detailed the Israeli King's prerogatives: "And he said, This will be the manner of the king that shall reign over you….And he will take your fields, and your vineyards, and your oliveyards, even the best of them, and give them to his servants.And he will take the tenth of your seed, and of your vineyards, and give to his officers,and to his servants.And he will take your menservants, and your maidservants, and your goodliest young men, and your asses, and put them to his work.He will take the tenth of your sheep: and ye shall be his servants. And ye shall cry out in that day because of your king which ye shall have chosen you" Eventhough the Talmudic sages (Sanhedrin 20b) R. Jew who purchased confiscated property from a conqueror had to return it to its original owner, unless he acted in a particular way to compensate the original owner, as specified in the Mishnah. 25 The term "during the war" simply describes the point in time in which the original owner despairs of retrieving his possessions that were 23 Mishnah. During the war, the soldiers were ordered to kill the inhabitants and the Jew was happy to save his life by giving up his land, and was forced to transfer ownership. Therefore, whoever buys from the conqueror acquires the land legally. Unlike the monolithic approach in the talmudic literature to the transfer of ownership through war, some medieval rabbinic scholars adopted a new approach to "conquest by war" that gave the word "war" a halakhic meaning. War was no longer simply a factual point in time but a legal concept. "Military conquest" and "acquisition by war" became autonomous legal terms with a life of their own. As we as was mentioned above, 28 war is a point in time wherein a Jew begins to "despair,"
Two Approaches to the Transfer of Ownership through Conquest in
(y'iush) which leads to the loss of his rights in land and goods confiscated by soldiers in return for not taking his life. By contrast, in some of the medieval rabbinical literature, "conquest by war" and "acquisition by war" became autonomous means for nullifying the ownership of the property's original owner, and a forceful means of acquisition without legal complications. The legitimacy of "conquest by war" is based on the halakhic "public-international" laws of war between nations, as described above, in which one nation annexes the land of another nation. However, in some of the medieval rabbinic literature, conquest by war refers not only to the transfer of ownership of land, but halakhah adapts it to the private domain of the transfer of ownership of any property between individuals without it entailing any legal hindrance. 26 The terms despair, resignation, abandonment, relinquishing, and giving up right to ownership are used interchangeably in this paper to describe the halakhic concept of yi'ush. The medieval rabbinic authorities hold differing halakhic positions in this regard.
Rif, 34 Maimonides, 35 and Rashba 36 all view "conquest by war" as a legal autonomic 32 Tosafot Rid Gittin 38a (Lis ed., p. 104).
33 Yad Ramah, Sanhedrin 94b, s.v. akhar ha-devarim. He concludes that the two approaches lead to the same ruling.
Even in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries there are theoretical discussions among the rabbis of Eastern Europe and Erez Israel concerning the distinction between conquest and the owner's resignation over the loss of his property. R.
Avraham Duber Kahanna-Shapira, Chief Rabbi of Kovno, Lithuania before the Holocaust, 41 addressed the subject in considerable detail and is often cited by contemporary halakhic decisors. According to him, the dispute between the early authorities appears to be based upon two different conceptions of conquest, but he does not rule as to which approach to follow. resignation of ownership. In the following section, we will present the rationale behind their different approaches to the transfer of ownership through conquest.
Insights into the Two Approaches to the Transfer of Ownership through Conquest
Why did the medieval rabbinic authorities have two different theoretical approaches to the transfer of ownership through conquest? What is the practical difference between "conquest" and the owner's "yi'ush"? The medieval halakhic authorities did not provide the reasons for their rulings, and the early later halakhic authorities, who also used the concept "conquest" and explained its significance, did not juxtapose it to the traditional halakhic yi'ush.
Are there practical differences between these two approaches? We would like to suggest a number of fundamental points of disagreement between the two. These differences have practical ramifications for resolving problems arising between Jews with regard to property that had been plundered or nationalized during a war, as shall be discussed below.
(a) The Identity of the Conqueror/Plunderer
One of the differences between the two approaches to the transfer of ownership though conquest can be determined by comparing the responsa of Maimonides and R.
Yoseph Ibn Migash, although they themselves do not supply reasons for their rulings.
Maimonides was asked "whether religious books purchased from a plunderer, but which had belonged to a synagogue in the town, become the property of the purchaser or whether the purchaser should be forced to return them?" He replied as follows:
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If the plunder had been carried out by order of the Sultan, then the sale is valid and the law of hekdesh (sacred property) does not apply. And even if we were talking about the Temple vessels, their sanctity would be nullified. ...
However, if they were plundered without the Sultan's permission, he should swear how much he paid for them and take the money, and return the book to its place.
We can infer that Maimonides extends the validity of conquest to encompass any acquisition under the Sultan's "royal prerogative," and not only an acquisition through war. 49 No. 209 (Blau, 370-371).
Maimonides' teacher's teacher, R. Yoseph Ibn Migash 50 appears to hold the opposite opinion. He too was asked if it is permissible to buy holy books plundered by order of the Sultan, and if bought, must they be returned to the original owners? From his responsum we learn that the answer depends on an assessment of what was in the mind of the original owners. In his opinion, "even though the deed was carried out by order of the king, and there is no possibility of appealing his decision," the owner has not despaired, since "the books are of no use to anybody but Jews and only Jews would buy them." The original owners therefore expect "that if a Jew acquires the holy books, he will easily find the owners and the holy books will be returned." In R. Ibn Migash's opinion, not only does conquest not "purify" ownership of holy books by virtue of the owner's yi'ush, but whoever buys assets from the Sultan is not protected by the "marketovert rule" because "the buyer knew that the king stole them and sold them, and it has already been established that in the case of a 'famous thief' there is no protection for the buyer." than the value of unused paper, and was therefore prepared to sell the books to a Jew at the price of unused paper. And since the non-Jew is not aware of the added value, he has not acquired the added value by virtue of conquest.
[Consequently, a Jew who purchases holy books from a conqueror is actually purchasing property that still belongs to the original Jewish owner.]
Thus, those rabbinic authorities who follow the "conquest" approach can also make a distinction between religious books and other possessions. However, this distinction is not based on an assessment of the intent of the original owners who were robbed (as the yi'ush concept does), but on an assessment of the conquerors' intent, as to which property he intended to apply royal prerogative and to which he did not. 51 Tosafists Baba Kama 114b, s.v. hamakir. Based on these sources, R. Rath ruled that "in this case, the Nazis may be compared to a lion or bear or worse, as nothing could be rescued from them."
R. Rath was of the opinion that even if there is a rabbinical decree which states that lost property should be returned, it does not apply to the complainant, as he is the bequester's son. The Torah crown is a bequest of a sacred object and the person who bequests it no longer owns it. Were the person who bequested it still alive, he could claim the right to decide where to donate it, but as he is deceased, the son does not inherit this right.
According to R. Rath, the fate of the Torah crown must be decided on the grounds of classical private law (i.e., yi'ush), irrespective of the question of conquest. 56 R. Ovadiah Hadiah disagrees with R. Rath's assumption regarding an owner who has given up hope of retrieving his property because the Nazis may be compared to a lion or bear and maybe even worse, as nobody is capable of defending their property against them. In his responsa, Yaskil Avdi, part 6, chapter 20, he writes: "With all due respect, nobody would deny that they are worse than a lion or bear, but everybody knows that their major concern was to murder ... and that the financial aspect was incidental. And I have even heard that many of the victims' relatives who returned after the war found their possessions intact, but in some cases the neighbors had plundered the house... And I would not compare the situation to that of the lion and bear... even if they did take property, since they were fighting a war and could be defeated, as was the case. Therefore I do not think that the owner relinquished his rights."
Similarly, R. Yaakov Yehiel Weinberg, himself a holocaust survivor, is not of the opinion that the owner definitely gave up all hope of recovering property from the Nazis. In his responsa, Seride Esh, part 1, chapter 147, he was asked whether rescuing books from the library of the Rabbinical Seminar in Berlin during the Second World War could be compared to rescuing jetsam from the sea and the rescuer thus becoming the owner of the books? He answers: "I have my doubts about the comparison, since we know that evil men took all the books from the libraries and preserved them in a safe place... and we did not give up hope that the evil would disperse like smoke and the reign of evil would disappear... Thus the owners never gave up hope."
However, R. Menashe Klein, also a holocaust survivor, maintains that the owner had resigned himself to his loss. In his responsum, Mishane Halakhot, part 17, chapter 140, he documents his personal experiences as a refugee, describing what he thought and felt at each stage until he reached the United States. He rules: "It is therefore evident when the Jews left their houses and property together with everything they owned, without any protection, that they gave up hope immediately because they knew what would happen to their property... and certainly when they reached the ghetto and from the ghetto moved on to the concentration camp, who would not give up hope? They not only relinquished their possessions but also were resigned to giving up their lives and indeed they were proven right. Only one from a town and two from a family survived, and the survivors after the war did not think about their possessions. Most of them did not even try to go back to their houses, since they knew that there would be nothing to find."
Ironically, in their halakhic ruling, the rabbinical judges begin by following the line of thinking laid down by R. Rath, without mentioning his name, and point out that even according to classical halakhah there is no obligation to return the object as an act of piety, as R. Rath ruled based on the laws regarding the return of lost property. However, in this case we are dealing with a matter of theft. Therefore, the stolen property must be returned by virtue of the relevant rabbinic enactment, which is a particularly important and forceful rabbinic enactment that applies equally to all thieves and is enforceable in a rabbinical court. Thus, the crown must be returned by law, and the rights of the original owner are inherited by the son. However, it would seem that in this case, conquest is not relevant, since the Hungarian Nazis attacked those Jews who were living safely in their country under their government, and stole everything of value in their possession. This is not booty, but rather theft and evil-doing. Even afterwards, when, the possessions fell into the hands of the Americans, we cannot claim that they acquired them by conquest, since they had neither the desire nor the intention 57 Supra n. 42, p. 171.
of keeping them, but rather wished to return them to representatives of the Jewish people.
It seems to me that the rabbinical judges disputed R. Rath on two issues. First, they were of the opinion that an evil act carried out intentionally does not constitute "lost
property." The passage in the Babylonian Talmud that refers to "jetsam from the sea or a river" 58 is not referring to property confiscated by military conquest. By lost property, the Talmud is referring to property that was seized by the forces of nature without human intervention. Intentionally taking another person's property is theft, and a powerful rabbinic enactment requires the return of stolen property. However, in wartime, halakhah recognizes the existence of particular laws relating to conquest, which are based on "royal prerogative." Secondly, the judges present a revolutionary approach based on a responsum by R. David Ben Zimra, 59 that royal prerogative with regard to conquest by war is based upon the Torah's recognition of the power of the king to rule, and just as in times of peace civil law is halakhically valid if "the king enacts a law that treats all equally and does not treat anyone unfairly," similarly, the validity of ownership by virtue of conquest is dependent upon the fairness of the conquest process. Since Nazi behavior was totally discriminatory, their conquest is not regarded as conquest but as theft, and the Torah crown thus belongs to the original owner and is inherited by his son upon his death. Is the conqueror's ownership permanent or reversible? Here again there is a difference between the perspective of classical private law and that of royal prerogative.
Classical private law regards conquest as a factual state which leads the original owners to abandon their title to their property (yi'ush), which then becomes the property of the conqueror. The conqueror is the ruler, and he decides whether the property will be given to individuals, such as the plundering soldiers, or to the nation's treasury, which will then redistribute it. Since conquest is a fact, transfer of property from conquered to conqueror is irreversible, just like the transfer of property from seller to buyer or the purchase from a thief after the original owner abandons his claim out of despair of the likelihood that it will be returned.
However, if we view conquest in terms of "royal prerogative," then conquest does not effect a transfer of property from conquered to conqueror, but rather, it is a 
The Approach of Shari'a

General Background
Islam is not just a religion and a system of theological thought. It is also a jurisprudential system whose primary sources are religious texts -the Qur'an and Sunnah -which serve as the basis for deriving Islam's legal norms. The jurists arrive at several conclusions based on these two verses:
(1) It is incumbent upon non-Muslims to uphold God's commandments stated in these verses. Therefore, if God prohibits them from gaining control over Muslim property in any manner, they must obey this Divine decree and refrain from doing so.
(2) If a non-Muslim disobeys the aforementioned decree and does, in fact, seize control of Muslim property, the result is a complete nullification of any legal outcome of these actions, even on the individual level. (5) The outcome is that God grants a priori preference to Muslims; hence, there is no equality between believers and non-believers. Consequently, there is also no equality with regard to the legal outcome of act of war on the individual level.
(b) Sunni sources
In addition to the Qur'anic references, this view is also based on two stories in the Sunnah which recount events from the life of the Prophet Muhammad.
The first story (hereafter: the story of the slave) was reported by the second caliph Umar Ibn al Khattab.
72 Jurists also base their view on another event brought down in the Sunnah (hereafter: the story of ala'dbaa). At one point non-Muslims invaded al-Madina (the city to which the Prophet immigrated after leaving Mecca) and seized a woman and the Prophet's dromedary (named ala'dbaa), among other things. During the night the woman tried to escape from captivity, but each time she placed her hand on a dromedary, it cried out. This continued until she found the Prophet's dromedary, which remained silent as she mounted it. The woman then vowed that if she returned safely to al-Madina she would slaughter the dromedary and eat it. When the woman arrived in al-Madina, the townsfolk recognized the dromedary and returned it to its owner, the Prophet. The woman told the Prophet of her vow. Rebuking her for being ungrateful to the dromedary, the Prophet informed her that her vow was null and void since the animal had never been hers in the first place. According to the jurists, the normative lesson to be drawn from this event is that non-Muslims cannot acquire ownership of Muslim property by means of war.
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Jurists of the Shafi'i school interpreted the Prophet's statement to mean that the animal had remained under the ownership of the Prophet Muhammad and the infidels had never acquired ownership over it. Therefore, the woman could not acquire ownership over it either. The Prophet's statement that "An individual cannot make a vow or carry out an action regarding something he does not own and if he does so it has no validity," coincides with one of the basic laws of property and ownership: "nemo dat quod non haber." The jurists who hold the second view disagree with those of the first view and the way in which they reach their conclusions, and cite several sources supporting their own conclusion. We shall first discuss the sources from the Qur'an and Sunnah cited by the former, and then discuss their refutation of the first view. The Qur'an uses the term poor in this verse to describe people who do not own any property. 81 According to this verse, God describes the Muslims who left Mecca and left their belongings behind as poor. Describing them as such is consistent with the conclusion that non-Muslims had acquired Muslim property, since had they not, the Muslims would not have been considered poor, as they in fact own property.
(b) Sunni sources
The jurists of the second view base their opinion also on two stories from the Prophetic Sunnah. One of the stories is about a man who found a female dromedary that he owned in the possession of another man. They both turned to the Prophet Muhammad to judge the case. The man who claimed ownership proved that he was the original owner; the other party, however, claimed and proved that he had bought the animal from a non-Muslim who apparently had captured or plundered the animal from the owner. The prophet ruled that if, in fact, this was the case, the original owner could reclaim the animal if he so wished, but he must then compensate the other party and pay him the sum that he had paid the infidel.
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Based on this story, jurists of the second view conclude that non-Muslims had acquired ownership of the dromedary; therefore, once they sold the animal to the Muslim, the transaction was valid and the buyer is the legal owner. However, the original owner has the right to reclaim the animal if he fully compensates the buyer.
We can therefore conclude that a non-Muslim may acquire ownership of Muslim property.
The jurists of the first view (who reject the opinion that a non-believer may acquire property) maintain that it is doubtful that this incident ever occurred. A close inspection of this hadith shows that its chain of transmission is flawed since it does 80 In Arabic:
Ahmad b. Mahmud al-Nasafi, Tafsir al-Nasafi, vol. 4, p. 141. 82 Musannaf Ibn Abi Shayba, Kitab al-Jihad, vol. 7, p. 686, hadith no. 14. not reach the individual to whom the hadith is attributed. In technical terms, the hadith is "maqtu'" (fragmented), i.e. one link or more in the chain of transmission is missing. The jurists conclude from this hadith that the Prophet, who is asking a rhetorical question ("has 'Uqayl left us a home?"), had no home when he returned to Mecca because his home was now owned by the infidel 'Uqayl. Thus, infidels (in this case 'Uqayl) have the ability to acquire Muslim property (in this case, the Prophet's).
The jurists of the first view accept the validity of this incident, but argue that the acquisition was not a result of war, nor did Uqayl gain ownership against the Prophet's will. Instead, there were other reasons for the acquisition: Uqayl had either purchased the Prophet's home from him before the Prophet left Mecca, or he had inherited it from Abu Talib (the Prophet's uncle and 'Ali's father). Abu Talib remained an infidel, and according to the laws of inheritance of infidels at the time, the Prophet had no right to inherit property from infidels and they could not inherit him. Consequently, no sanctions, at the legal level, are brought against them as a result of such an acquisition. In actuality, the main point of contention between the two opinions is to whom the decrees derived from the verses of the Qur'an are addressed, and in particular, whether these decrees are intended also for non-Muslims.
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Jurists of the second view also relate to the hadiths cited by jurists of the first view. They agree that the story of the slave did in fact occur, but they claim that the Prophet's reluctance to transfer the slave to the new owners was based on the laws of slavery that were in effect at the time, according to which a slave who is found in the public domain must be returned to his original owners. Given this explanation, they claim that this incident has no relevance to the laws of war and therefore no bearing on the laws of booty. It is merely an implementation of the existing rules and laws of slavery.
In addition, these jurists argue that the story of ala'dbaa -the prophet's dromedary -supports their view that non-Muslims may acquire ownership over Muslim private property taken in war. They give reasons for the prophet's nullification of the woman's vow to slaughter the ala'dbaa:
a. Ownership of property confiscated in war is acquired by infidels only if the property reaches infidel territory (Dar al-Harb). In this case, the animal had not yet reached infidel territory, thus, never officially becoming infidel property and therefore remaining the property of the Prophet.
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B. Even if the animal had in fact become infidel property, once it is returned whole and identified by its original owner, ownership reverts to him. 
The ability and right of the original owner to regain ownership of his property
Muslim private property that was captured by non-Muslims can revert to Muslim ownership in one of the following scenarios: 1. during a subsequent battle; 2.
following the current non-Muslim owner's conversion to Islam; 3. following a sale transaction between the non-Muslim and another Muslim, as part of which the property is turned over to the other Muslim.
In all of the above scenarios, the original Muslim owner may claim that he is still the owner of the property and therefore it must be returned to him. The question arises as to whether the property should be returned to the original owner or whether it should remain with the current owner (the warrior, the convert, or the Muslim who purchased it).
According to jurists who support the first view, the answer is obvious and The original owner identifies his property prior to it being distributed among the warriors
In this case we identify two separate approaches:
One approach states that the property must be returned to its owner unconditionally. (b) The owner identifies his property after it was divided up among the warriors
In this case we can identify four different approaches:
(1) The property must be returned to the original owner without compensation. So as to not infringe upon the warriors' rights, they may be compensated from public funds (Bait El Mal). 98 Thus, for example, Jurist al Shukani states: "A Muslim does not lose his ownership rights if the property is taken by a non-Muslim, and it therefore must be returned to him. However if the spoils have already been divided up among the warriors, the warrior who received it must be compensated from public funds."
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Proponents of this approach rely mostly on the story of the ala'dbaa cited above, 100 in which the Prophet rebuked the woman for her vow to slaughter the animal, telling her that she did not in fact own the animal but rather he did, thus rendering her vow invalid. The jurists infer from this case that property belonging to a Muslim taken by non-Muslims and then taken back by Muslims must be returned to the original owner.
This approach is accepted by most jurists because it provides a fair balance of the rights of the warriors and those of the owner. On the one hand, the property is returned to its rightful owner, and on the other hand, the warriors receive the value of the property from public funds as compensation for their efforts in battle.
(2) The owner reserves the right to redeem his property in exchange for Here, too, we find no unified position, and we can point to two main approaches:
According to the first approach, ownership lies with the new buyer, but the original owner has the right to redeem the property. In other words, the buyer retains ownership pending the original owner's ability to redeem the property for a price. A second approach, found only in the Zahiriya school, states that, in this case, the original owner takes precedence, and the property must be returned to him without compensation. The jurists supporting this approach provide no explanation.
This issue has been discussed also by modern jurists. A perusal of modern Shari'a literature shows that a considerable number of modern jurists advocate the first approach, which recognizes the original owner's right to redeem his property. Nevertheless, we can distinguish between two fundamental approaches.
According to one approach, ownership of the property is transferred to the purchaser, but the original owner has the right to redeem the property from him. According to the second approach, which apparently is accepted by only one stream in shari'a, the property is returned to its original owner.
E. According to the above two legal systems, there is no dichotomy between the public aspect -that is, the relationship between the successor state and the predecessor state -and the private level with regard to the approach of the successor state to the property of the conquered population. The laws of military conquest in shari'a focus more on the laws of waging war, when to declare war, and the proper conduct towards non-believers during the war, and less so on the consequences of the war, particularly when the victors are nonMuslim. 125 Halakhah, by contrast, focuses on the consequences of war and plundered Jewish property; it is far less concerned with the reasons for going to war and the behavior of a Jewish successor king towards a conquered population during wartime. This is due to the fact that Muslims largely regarded themselves as the victorious party in most of the wars in which they were involved during that period. By contrast, dealing with laws for declaring war would have been regarded by halakhah as a utopian state of affairs;
halakhah therefore focused entirely on the consequences of war -the validity of transferring ownership of Jewish spoils of war to another Jew.
F. We will mention one further difference. Shari'a pertains to a religion which, in theory and in practice, wishes to dominate the world. Therefore the behavior of a non-believing conqueror must be governed by the laws of shari'a, or at least be consistent with its ways. Halakhah, by contrast, regards itself as applying only to members of the Mosaic faith. Halakhah's concern is not with members of other faiths and it does not demand that they observe its practices. Therefore, a successor king may impose his laws on Jews, and his laws apply also to Jews who are in a state of conflict with non-Jews, on condition that the king's laws are accepted as reasonable and fair.
125 Lewis supra n. 5
